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Abstract: 
This work shows that defective behaviors from the cooperative equilibrium in the management of 
common resources can be fueled and triggered by the presence of agents with myopic behaviors. The 
behavior implemented by naïve agents, even if performed with cooperative intent, can activate a dynamic 
of cascading defections from the cooperative strategy within the harvesters’ group.  
This paper demonstrates and discusses that the apparent and detectable decay of the cooperative choices 
in the dilemmas of common resources is not an exclusive and indisputable signal of an escalation in free-
riding intentions but also an outcome of the present-biased preferences and myopic behaviors of the 
cooperative agents. Notably, within the context populated by conditional cooperators with a 
heterogeneous myopic discount factor, in the absence of information on agents’ intentions, the present-
biased preferences can trigger a strategy that directs the community to excessively increase its harvesting 
level, even in presence of the other-regarding motives. Therefore, lowering cooperative behaviors can 
also be the effect of the absence of coordination instruments in response to the cognitive bias that 
influences human behaviors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the task of managing common resources, one of the main issues that a community 
faces is avoiding the trigger of the tragedy of the commons. Non-collapsing 
management of the commons largely depends on the cooperative capabilities of 
communities and their ability to maintain the cooperation inside groups over time. This 
study shows when and in what manner there is involvement of present-biased 
preferences in the triggering of strategies that contribute to non-cooperative behaviors in 
common harvesting. 
Cooperative behaviors have been largely investigated in behavioral economics (Ernst 
Fehr and Gächter 2000; Gächter 2007; Sally 1995), and other-regarding and social 
preferences are found in everyday life (Gintis 2000) and in a wide range of situations 
and cultures (Alpizar et al. 2008; Frey and Meier 2004; Meier and Stutzer 2008; 
Henrich et al. 2005). Nevertheless, in presence of social preferences, when individuals 
participate in common pool resources or public good games, in the absence of 
coordination and enforcement instruments or institutions, cooperative behaviors 
frequently decay (Andreoni 1988; Dawes and Thaler 1988; E. Fehr and Schmidt 1999; 
Gintis 2000; Gintis et al. 2003; Isaac et al. 1994; Ledyard 1994). When individuals 
cooperate only when others also cooperate (conditional cooperators), the presence of 
free riders, or individuals without full cooperative behaviors, can trigger a dynamic of 
defection by cooperation (Fischbacher et al. 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010).  
When resource management includes specific intertemporal peculiarities with relevant 
externalities, resource harvesting is vulnerable to the risks of inefficient intertemporal 
management. This phenomenon is evident when observing the difficulties that 
individuals often encounter in defining intertemporal choices and allocating 
consumption in a consistent manner. This phenomenon refers to the existence of 
present-biased preferences. Notably, individuals, because of their impulsivity, follow 
short-term benefits without adequately considering long-term consequences, particularly 
in situations where individuals systematically behave by discounting the near future 
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more than the distant future (G. Loewenstein and Prelec 1992). These behaviors reveal a 
lack of self-control when individuals feel pressured by the present (D. Laibson 1997; T. 
O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). This situation occurs when because of present-biased 
preferences, the immediate benefit directs the choices despite the long-run interest, 
which is true also in social dilemmas. In Herr et al. (1997), for example, participants 
interact in a common pool resource experiment that reveals lower efficiency when the 
experimental design provides intertemporal externalities, showing substantially 
shortsighted behaviors. The participants, notably, do not adequately consider the future 
consequences of their decisions, and they show shortsighted behaviors in dynamic 
games (Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin 2013).    
Myopic behavioral patterns are particularly dangerous in the context of common 
resources because they can generate rapid resource depletion. Generally, common 
resource dilemmas are defined within a context in which the long-run choices and short-
run choices can conflict, exposing the resources to the risks derived from present bias. 
Thus, the role played by present bias in the decay dynamics of cooperation in the 
commons could be consistent with the systematic decline of the cooperative propensity 
with the passage of time. Notably, one of the salient elements present in common 
resource experiments is the progressive decay of the cooperative behaviors with the 
advancement of the interactions (Ostrom 2000).  
When resources are commons with intertemporal harvesting peculiarities, the decay of 
cooperation intentions can be the main obstacle to the preservation of a given stock of 
resources. Hence, the reason why the decay of cooperation in the commons has so much 
relevance is clear. However, in this context, the role of the cognitive biases is not 
adequately investigated, namely, if and in what manner can present bias affect the 
dynamics of the cooperation inside the group. Notably, although cooperation capability 
as part of human evolutionary success was confirmed (Gintis 2009), why societies 
sometimes do not achieve the level of fairness and cooperation that they desire has not 
been investigated. Therefore, this work presents a representation of human behaviors 
that do not exclude these cognitive foundations of the process of decision-making in the 
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intertemporal context. Without the necessary inclusion of the intertemporal cognitive 
features of human behavior, the models used to describe the human phenomena in 
resource harvesting are unable to include some of the real issues that can trigger the 
defective strategies from cooperation in the management of the common resources that 
generate the overexploitation. 
 
2. Present bias and why take care of it in the commons 
 
Present bias refers to behaviors derived from the duality of the discount rate in short-
term and long-term periods that determine a non-consistent time behavior in tasks that 
require intertemporal planning. Time inconsistency implies that an optimal choice 
defined in the present could be revisited in the future (Strotz 1955). The present bias 
thus determines the emergence of preference reversals that generate a conflict between 
long-run preferences and immediate choices, resulting in a conflict between the early 
intention of the agent and the choice made at the moment. The genesis of these 
phenomena has a solid cognitive foundation.  
Notably, researchers of cognitive neuroscience have supported a non-constant discount 
rate, namely, two ways to process the discounting: for immediate rewards and for 
delayed rewards.1 Experiments have revealed the activation of the limbic circuit just 
prior to choices that provide an immediate reward (Samuel M McClure et al. 2004). 
Similar conclusions have also been drawn by Hariri et al. (2006) and McClure et al. 
                                                 
1 Two distinct brain areas are involved in the definition of intertemporal choices. The first area, the limbic 
and paralimbic, is a brain region heavily innervated by the dopaminergic system and connected to 
rewards expectation (Breiter and Rosen 1999; Knutson et al. 2001; Samuel M. McClure et al. 2003), 
whereas the other area belongs to the front-parietal region, an area that supports higher cognitive 
functions (G. F. Loewenstein et al. 2008). 
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(2007).2 The joint involvement of two systems in decision-making processes is further 
supported by Bechara (2005), Bechara et al. (1999), Damasio (1994), and LeDoux 
(1996). Therefore, for choices defined in an intertemporal context, the dualism between 
the limbic system and the deliberative-cognitive system of the neocortex highlights a 
distinction between the reactions in responses to short-term and long-term stimuli.  
Information related to immediate rewards is mostly subjected to processing by the 
impulsive system, and a more appropriate reflective system refers to decisions regarding 
long-run rewards. A possible assertion is that the present bias is an element of decision-
making processes deeply rooted in human nature, in several areas of an individual’s life. 
Notably, present-biased behaviors are also clearly evident in several situations (Della 
Vigna 2009; Frederick et al. 2002; Thaler 1981) and different contexts, such as the low 
saving rate (Ashraf et al. 2006; Harris and Laibson 2001; D. Laibson 1997; D. I. 
Laibson et al. 1998); health choices (van der Pol and Cairns 2002); addiction to drugs, 
tobacco smoking, or shopping (Frederick et al. 2002; Gruber and Koszegi 2001; Thaler 
and Shefrin 1981; Wertenbroch 1998); and procrastination behaviors (Benabou and 
Tirole 2003; T. O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999).  
The unifying factor in all these fields is the contrasting dichotomy between long-term 
well-being and immediate enjoyment. This dichotomy characterizes the emergence of 
present-biased behaviors. Present bias seems, therefore, to be a specific peculiarity of 
decision heuristics on intertemporal choices in frameworks where long-term plans can 
                                                 
2 The limbic circuit is the seat of the emotional reaction processes (A R Hariri et al. 2000) and impulsive 
behaviors (Pattij and Vanderschuren 2008); in fact the limbic system - the most ancient part of a human’s 
brain – also includes the amygdala (Isaacson 1974), whose functions are closely related to emotional 
activities (Cardinal et al. 2002; Ahmad R. Hariri et al. 2002). Vice versa, a second area that it is afferent to 
the neocortex, the most recently formed brain area from an evolutionary perspective, shows prevalent 
activation in correspondence of actions that are the outcome of choices that take future gains into 
consideration best. This second area, exclusive to mammals and distinctly developed in humans (Rachlin 
1989), plays a key role in appropriate deliberative-cognitive activities. 
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be subject to revision and where the long-term outcomes depend on a continuum of 
instantaneous or short-term choices. These peculiarities also define the framework of 
common resource dilemmas. Notably, the intertemporal management of the commons 
has the characteristics of the framework in which the long-term and short-term choices 
can conflict, consequently exposing the resources to the risks that can derive from 
behaviors strongly oriented to the present. In resource exploitation, the present bias and 
naïve behaviors could prove dangerous to the sustainability of the resources; notably, in 
the absence of time consistency, an undesired collapse of natural resources could occur 
(Hepburn et al. 2010). Hence, when conflict arises between short-term and long-term 
interests, such as in the management of common resources, present-biased preferences 
are likely to play a critical role.3 
The commons is a field in which the relevant elements of human choosing are not 
limited to the area of intertemporal resources management and in which human sociality 
plays a diriment role. On the one hand, the adoption of sustainable and cooperative 
behaviors in relevant social dilemmas depends on the degree of consciousness of the 
effect of their behaviors on others, and on the common resources; this inclination finds 
form in cooperative and other-regarding motives. On the other hand, the choices made 
reflect the capability of correctly reading and weighing costs and benefits that result 
from an individual’s choices. The intertemporal decision-making processes that involve 
the present-biased preferences directing these choices are also the paths by which 
individuals solve social dilemmas. Within this process, cooperation is also realized. For 
these reasons, cooperative behaviors and intertemporal dynamics must be analyzed 
together.  
                                                 
3 In renewable resources management, the literature has already shown that present biased-preferences 
can reduce the agent’s welfare (Persichina, 2019 b) and that in the context of the intergenerational transfer 
of resources, the present bias can generate intergenerational inequality even in presence of other-
regarding preferences (Persichina, 2019 a). 
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The contributions to understanding the role of other-regarding preferences in social 
dilemmas are abundant in the literature and reveal that the cooperation and fairness 
principle contributes to the formulation of the agent's choices (Ernst Fehr and Gächter 
2000; Gächter 2007; Ostrom et al. 1994). Several works have investigated the true 
foundations of economics when individuals make decisions within a social context, 
showing with undisputed clarity that an individual’s decisions are mediated by other-
regarding motives and by prosocial concepts such as fairness, cooperation, and 
reciprocity (Andreoni 1990; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; G. Charness and Rabin 2002; 
Falk and Fischbacher 2006; E. Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Rabin 1993). Furthermore, the 
consequences of the introduction of the other-regarding preferences in the theoretical 
framework on the management of the commons draw great attention and offer 
additional elements of analysis for applications in environmental and resources issues 
(Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman 2012; Gowdy 
2008; Gsottbauer and van den Bergh 2011; S. Frey and Stutzer 2006). Additionally, in 
the field of the commons, several studies have confirmed the ability of individuals to 
voluntarily sustain cooperation in resource dilemmas (Casari and Plott 2003; Gary 
Charness and Villeval 2009; Chaudhuri 2011; Ernst Fehr and Leibbrandt 2011; Ledyard 
1994; Ostrom et al. 1992).  
However, merely emphasizing the presence of the cooperative will of individuals is not 
possible because of the necessity to truly comment on the frequent observations, 
especially in controlled experiments, of the systematic decay of cooperative behaviors 
over time in repeated interactions (Ostrom 2000). The reasons for the decay of the 
cooperation propensity over time is an argument of great relevance, not merely 
theoretically but also from the applied perspective: when confronted with resources, 
which are intrinsically commons and have an intertemporal harvesting peculiarity, the 
decay of the cooperation instances can become the main obstacle to the preservation of 
a given stock of common resources over time and generations. However, in this context, 
the role of cognitive biases has not been adequately explored. If and in which manner 
phenomena such as present bias can affect the dynamics of cooperation and its decay 
remains to be defined.  
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But, as has been discussed here, the dynamics of harvesting in the commons has a 
double determination that involves both the cognitive sphere (i.e., intertemporal 
decision-making processes) and the social sphere (i.e., cooperative attitudes). Thus, the 
role of present-biased preferences in the decay of cooperation must be clarified to 
demonstrate that shortsighted behaviors derived from present bias can be involved in 
the decay of cooperative interactions over time and within a framework that includes 
common resources, even when agents have preferences for cooperation. Therefore, the 
following sections demonstrate the involvement of present bias in triggering strategies 
that contribute to non-cooperative behavior in common harvesting, determining 
cascading defections. 
 
3. Harvesting model and baseline emerged behaviors  
 
The model concerns the activity of harvesting from a stock of non-perishable resources, 
and a discrete time framework is considered. The stock of resources at time t is 𝑅(𝑡), 
with 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] and T ≠  ∞. The harvested amount at time t is expressed as ℎ(𝑡). The 
fundamental equation of the dynamics of the growth of the resources is as follows: 𝑅(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝑅(𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡),  (1) 
where the growth rate, 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)), is not negative.4 In a case in which the stock size 
does not affect the growth rate, the resource stock grows at a constant and strictly 
positive exponential rate equal to 𝑔, such that 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)) ≥ 0 and 𝑔 > 0,    (2) 
and 
                                                 
4 The non-negative growth rate is derived from the non-perishability of the resources.   
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if 𝜕𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝜕𝑅(𝑡) = 0 → 𝑅(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡) = (𝑔 − ℎ̂)𝑅(𝑡) with  ℎ̂ = ℎ(𝑡)𝑅(𝑡) . (3) 
The time interval from 0 to T is the finite lifetime of a single agent. Moreover, the initial 
stock of resources and the growth rate are known by all the agents. 
The initial stock at time zero is strictly positive. An assumption is that resources are 
material; therefore, a negative stock is not possible: 𝑅(𝑡) ≥ 0  with  𝑅(0) = 𝑅0 ∧ 𝑅0 > 0    ∀  𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (4) 
The amount harvested at time t by the agent, ℎ(𝑡), is not restorable; therefore, ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇].  (5) 
The agent faces a capacity constraint: in each period, she cannot harvest more than ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥, a value that is strictly positive and finite; thus, together with the non-negativity 
constraint, 0 ≤ ℎ(𝑡) ≤ ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥    ∀  𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]    with   ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 0 and ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≠ ∞.   (6) 
Furthermore, each agent also faces a resources constraint such that she cannot harvest at 
time t more than the stock of resources available in that moment: ℎ(𝑡) ≤ 𝑅(𝑡)    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇].  (7) 
Both the capacity and resource constraints are assumed exogenous and equal for all the 
agents. 
The model assumes only material resources and no exchange market; hence, the welfare 
of the agents depends only on the amount of resources harvested and enjoyed at each 
time; thus, the lifetime utility of the agent evaluated at time 0 is 
𝑈 =∑𝛿(𝑡) 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=0 .  (8) 
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The monotonicity and strict concavity of the utility function is assumed:5 𝑢′(ℎ𝑡) > 0     𝑢′′(ℎ𝑡) < 0    ∀ ℎ𝑡 ∈ ℛ+.     (9) 
The discount factor 𝛿(𝑡) represents the degree of impatience with harvesting. Agents 
exhibit impatience with the harvesting time, such that 𝛿′ < 0;6 thus, the discount factor 
is monotonic and decreasing over time with 𝛿(𝑡) > 𝛿(𝑡 + 1)  ∀𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (10) 
The problem of the optimal harvesting path can be summarized as the maximization of 
the agent’s utility function (8) under the constraints expressed in (4), (6) and (7) when 
the initial condition and the natural growth rate respect the non-negative constraints and 
the dynamic of resource growth is defined by (1).  
Thus, assuming continuity for the harvesting amount on the interval [0, ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥], given the 
discount factors 𝐷 = {δ(0),… , δ(t),…, δ(T)} that respect the peculiarity just enounced,  
at any time 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇], there is just one optimal solution for the problem of maximization 
that the agent must face.  
Of course, the intertemporal harvesting plan depends on the form of the discount factor, 
in particular, if it is expressed in an exponential manner that guarantees time 
consistency, or if the agent has another form of discount that generates time 
inconsistency such as in the case of present-biased preferences.  
Hence, two possible and alternative outcomes from the process of optimization are 
considered. The first is the no-bias optimal harvesting strategy expressed as follows: 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}.  (11) 
                                                 
5 This guarantees the existence of a unique optimal solution.  
6 With this assumption, the case of pleasure in procrastination, δ′(t) > 0, is excluded. 
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The no-bias optimal harvesting strategy, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡, is the strategy defined when the discount 
factor of the agent is expressed in an exponential manner that guarantees time 
consistency. 7 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡  also corresponds to the long-run optimal harvesting plan for the 
agent (Ted O’Donoghue and Rabin 2002). Clearly, in the presence of time consistency, 
the agent does not vary her optimal strategy with the passage of time.   
The second possible outcome of the process of optimization, the biased harvesting 
strategy, defined as 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 , occurs when time inconsistency is assumed. Time 
inconsistency implies that the discount factor of the agent is not constant over time; 
thus, an assumption is that 
{ 
 𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+1 > 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1       with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 = 0,𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+1 ≥ 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1       with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 > 0. (12) 
The consequences of a no constant discount factor can be defined in Postulate 1. 
 
Postulate 1: If it is solved at time t, t < s, with 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1 = 𝛿𝑠+1𝛿𝑠+2, the problem of intertemporal 
optimization in the interval [𝑠, 𝑇], with an existent unique optimal solution : 𝐻𝑡 = {𝐸[ℎ(𝑠)]𝑡 , . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑠 + 1)]𝑡, . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑇)]𝑡} , where 𝐸[ℎ(𝑠)]𝑡  is the expected 
harvesting amount for time s, and at time s, the same optimization problem is solved in 
the interval [𝑠, 𝑇] with the following optimal solution: 𝐻𝑠 = {ℎ(𝑠), . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑠 + 1)]𝑠, . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑇)]𝑠} ; when 𝐸[ℎ(𝑠)]𝑡 < 𝑅(𝑠)  and 𝐸[ℎ(𝑠)]𝑡 <ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 and time s  𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1 > 𝛿𝑠+1𝛿𝑠+2  with 𝜕𝛿𝜕𝑡 < 0; then, ℎ(𝑠) > 𝐸[ℎ(𝑠)]𝑡. 
                                                 
7 Agent has no biased preferences when 𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+𝑛  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] and ∀ 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇] . Only when the 
discounting respects this condition will the agent’s evaluation of the optimal strategy in every period s 
between 0 and T conduct to the same optimal harvesting strategy evaluated in any period t in [0, T]. 
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Thus, as anticipated, the agent can be present-biased and, in this case, the biased 
harvesting strategy can be expressed as follows: 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}. (13) 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 is derived from the instantaneous maximization at each time of the utility of the 
agent as well the 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡, but contrary to the case of no-bias optimal harvesting strategy, 
the discount factor incorporates the present-bias peculiarities expressed in (12) under 
the constraints expressed earlier. 8  The consequences can be synthesized in the 
following: 
 
Lemma 1: Given an expected harvesting amount formulated at time t, ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) >  0, 
with t < s, t and s in [0,T] and ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) <  ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥, under the assumption of present bias 
defined in (12), if 𝑅(𝑠) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) and 𝑅(𝑠) = 𝐸[𝑅(𝑠)]𝑡 , where 𝑅(𝑠) is the resources 
stock at time s and 𝐸[𝑅(𝑠)]𝑡 is the expected stock estimated at time t, at time s, the 
agent harvests an amount greater than the amount predicted for the same period in the 
optimal strategy formulated at time t, ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠), which could be harvested in absence of 
bias, such that  ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑠) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠)  with ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) ∈ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡  and ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑠) ∈ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠. (14) 
 
Notably, when 𝑅(𝑠) = 𝐸[𝑅(𝑠)]𝑡, in the interval [s, T], at time t in the no-bias condition 
the agent will face the same situation faced at time s, but under the bias condition. Thus, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑖 at time t, where 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 is the optimal harvesting plan evaluated at time t and 𝐻𝑖 
is any other harvesting plan different from 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 in the set of all possible plans, and 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 
                                                 
8 Notably that both the hyperbolic that quasi-hyperbolic discounts respond to the property defined. 
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is defined under the hypothesis of an exponential discount such that 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1 =𝛿𝑠+1𝛿𝑠+2  with 𝜕𝛿𝜕𝑡 < 0 and, ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) ∈ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡. However, at time s with 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1 > 𝛿𝑠+1𝛿𝑠+2 and 𝜕𝛿𝜕𝑡 < 0, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 ≻ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ; hence, at time s, the situation expressed in Postulate 1 occurs. Thus, 
because ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∧ ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) < 𝑅(𝑠) it will be  ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑠) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠). 
 
Hence given a context in which it is effectively possible to assist in a reduction of the 
stock of resources, the existence of present-biased preferences could move out the 
harvesting path. This context is characterized by a situation where the agents cannot 
avoid total exploitation of the resources before the end of the periods if they harvest the 
amount hmax continuously in the interval [0,T]. Obviously, in this context, the agent is 
called to determine a harvesting plan that contains the following condition:  𝑅0 +∑ [[𝑅(𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡)] ⋅ 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))]𝑇−1𝑡=0  −  ∑∑ [ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅  (1 + 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)))𝑡 ]𝑇−1𝑡=0𝑁𝑛=1 ≤ 0, (15) 
where N is the number of agents that harvest from the stock.  
The (15) implies that there is at least one period in which ℎ(𝑡) < hmax . Then, 
considering that the agent tends distribute her consumption over time, the assumption is 
that the agent’s intertemporal preferences are given such that 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0),… , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), … , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠)… , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇) |0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥∧0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 }. (16)  
This implies that if ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀ 𝑡 ∈  [0, 𝑡𝑏 − 1], then ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) < 𝑅(𝑡𝑏) must be 
true to have 0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥. Thus, considering the implications of (15) and (16) 
and Lemma 1, the following assertion is possible: 
 
Lemma 2: Given conditions (15) and (16), and given two possible strategies that can be 
derived by the decision-making process of the agent, the first one,  
 14 
 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}, in which, at time 𝑡𝑏, 𝛿𝑡𝑏𝛿𝑡𝑏+1 = 𝛿𝑡𝑏+1𝛿𝑡𝑏+2 , and the 
second one, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)} , in which, at time 𝑡𝑏 , 𝛿𝑡𝑏𝛿𝑡𝑏+1 > 𝛿𝑡𝑏+1𝛿𝑡𝑏+2 , in the time interval [0,T], there is at least one period, 𝑡𝑏 , such that ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏). 
 
Notably, R0 is unique and invariable with respect to the strategy implemented, and (15) 
implies that there is at least one period where ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 and at least one period 
where ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥. Given the existence of a first period in which ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡) is lower 
than ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑡𝑏 , if ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥and ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥,clearly, ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎 𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏). 
Additionally, when ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 and ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥, because in this first period, 𝑅(𝑡𝑏) clearly has the same value in both strategies, and because 𝑅(𝑡𝑏) must be greater 
than ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) as consequence of (16), taking care of Lemma 1, the present bias as 
expressed in (12) determines that ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏). 
 
The lemmas just enounced have deep consequences in relation to the outcome of the 
cooperative behavior implemented by an agent inside a group of harvesters managing a 
common stock of resources. Notably, the same relationship expressed in these 
propositions also exists when an agent inside a group has cooperative behavior. 
Notably, two possible outcomes of the process of maximization also exist in the case of 
cooperative intentions of the agent: one in the case of the exponential discount rate and 
the other derived by present-biased preferences. Both outcomes correspond to a 
cooperative strategy: in the first case, it is a no-bias cooperative strategy (called the 
“optimal strategy”), and in the second case it is a biased cooperative strategy (hereafter 
the “biased strategy”).  
 
The context in which the agents cooperate in the management of the commons are so 
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defined: the number of the harvester, N, is common knowledge, and homogeneity is 
assumed between the N agents in the instantaneous harvesting utilities 𝑢𝑛(ℎ𝑡) with  0 ≤ℎ𝑡 ≤ ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥, ∀ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁.9 Recall that the agent does not exercise a deliberative choice of 
one or the other strategies, but can choose between cooperating and being a free rider 
(or stop cooperating). Implementation of the optimal strategy by a biased agent is not 
possible because of the naïve nature of a biased agent who is not conscious of the 
implementation of a biased strategy.10  
Therefore, for the single cooperative agent, when she choices to cooperate, the optimal 
solution is given by the maximization of the sum of the utility of the N agents:11 
𝑚𝑎𝑥ℎ𝑖  ∑𝑈𝑖𝑁𝑖=1   where  𝑈𝑖 =∑𝛿𝑖(𝑡) 𝑢(ℎ𝑖(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=0 , (17) 
under the constraints and conditions expressed earlier. 
Under the hypothesis of the absence of present bias,12 the cooperative harvesting plan is 
the optimal cooperative strategy: 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑐 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑐 (𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑐 (𝑇)}. (18) 
The following is easy to understand: that a lower amount left unharvested, with respect 
to the prediction of the optimal cooperative strategy, is also the observable effect of a 
potential act of free riding. In particular, free-riding behavior at a given time t could 
emerge when the agent harvests an amount greater than the optimal cooperative amount: 
                                                 
9 In the following, heterogeneity is assumed in the bias factor. 
10 In this model naïveté of the biased agents is assumed such that naïve agents are fully unaware of their 
intertemporal inconsistency and of their future re-evaluation of the harvesting amounts. 
11 The assumption is that there is homogeneity in the utility function, and consequently, the cooperative 
agent maximizes the sum of the utilities. 
12The hypothesis is satisfied when 𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+𝑛  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇]  ∧  ∀ 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. 
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ℎ𝑓(𝑡) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑐 (𝑡).  (19) 
Proceeding with the no-biased behavior, a biased cooperative agent maximizes the total 
amount harvested by the group of N agents as expressed in (17) when her utility 
function is 
𝑈𝑖 =∑𝛿𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡) 𝑢(ℎ𝑖(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=0 ,  (20) 
where 𝛿𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 has the properties expressed in (12). In this case, the agent adopts the biased 
cooperative strategy:  𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑐 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑐 (𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑐 (𝑇)}. (21) 
Now, considering the results described in Lemmas 1 and 2, given that (15) and (16) 
hold, it is possible to assert Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: Given two possible outcomes of the optimal solution in the presence of 
cooperative intentions of the agent, the optimal no-biased strategy is  𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑐 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑐 (𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑐 (𝑇)} , in which 𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+1 = 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1  ∀ 𝑡 , and the biased 
strategy 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑐 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑐 (𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑐 (𝑇)}, in which 𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+1 > 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1  for 𝑡 = 0 and 𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+1 ≥ 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1  for 𝑡 > 0, with 𝑡 < 𝑠 and 𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇].  
Then, interval (0, T] has least one period, denoted with 𝑡𝑏, such that ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑐 (𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑐 (𝑡𝑏). (22) 
 
Thus, if several reasons could lead the agents to defect by a perfect cooperative strategy, 
a pure cooperative agent could also implement a strategy that does not coincide with 
Hcopt even when her aim is “cooperate” because her choices can be affected by limited 
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capabilities in using a constant discount rate, as in the case of present bias. In what 
follows, the manner in which the effect of the present bias, also in the presence of 
cooperative intentions, can trigger the dynamics of defections is exposed. 
 
4. Cooperation failure because of the present bias  
 
In a situation in which (22) holds, if the agents cannot be sure of the biased nature of the 
choices of others, it is not possible for a member of the group to distinguish if another 
member of the group harvests an amount greater than the optimal cooperative because 
she has free-riding intentions or because it is a cooperative biased action. Therefore, 
excessive harvesting of some present-biased agent can be erroneously interpreted as an 
act of free riding and in a tit-for-tat strategy, can trigger a round of defections.  
To demonstrate this assertion, a situation with only two harvesters is considered. They 
are conditional cooperators that play a tit-for-tat strategy, harvesting simultaneously 
from the same stock of resources. It is possible to assign to one agent the capability to 
suppose that the other agent can be biased, but she has no information on the 
cooperative intentions of the other or on the biased discount factor; thus, the agent lacks 
any ability to distinguish the biased agents from the free riders. 13  The agents are 
homogeneous in the instantaneous harvesting utilities, 𝑢𝑖(ℎ𝑡) = 𝑢𝑗(ℎ𝑡) , but 
heterogeneity is assumed in the myopic discount factor 𝛿𝑏(𝑡) as defined in (12), 
denoting i and j as the agents, where the agent i has stronger present-biased preferences, 
then: 
                                                 
13 Here, the possibility that one of the two agents can be not biased is assumed. 
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  𝛿𝑖𝑏(𝑡)𝛿𝑖𝑏(𝑡+1) 𝛿𝑖𝑏(𝑠)𝛿𝑖𝑏(𝑠+1)⁄   >   
𝛿𝑗𝑏(𝑡)𝛿𝑗𝑏(𝑡+1) 𝛿𝑗𝑏(𝑠)𝛿𝑗𝑏(𝑠+1)⁄       with  𝑠 > 𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 0, (23) 
where the hypothetical case of no bias is 𝛿𝑖𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)𝛿𝑖𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡+1) = 𝛿𝑗𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)𝛿𝑗𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡+1). Now, considering (23), 
because the instantaneous harvesting utilities are 𝑢𝑖(ℎ𝑡) = 𝑢𝑗(ℎ𝑡), with 0 ≤ ℎ𝑡 < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥, 
(15) guarantees the existence of a period 𝑡𝑏  such that ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ; additionally, 
considering the results exposed in Proposition 1, ℎ𝑖𝑏(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏),  (24) 
where ℎ𝑖𝑏(𝑡𝑏) and ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) are the amounts effectively harvested by the agents, given the 
management strategies when behaviors are biased, at least for the agent i, and coincide 
with the cooperative amounts ℎ𝑖𝑐(𝑡𝑏) and ℎ𝑗𝑐(𝑡𝑏) as expressed in (21); then, ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑐 (𝑡𝑏) ≤ ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑖𝑏(𝑡𝑏). (25) 
Because the agent j does not have instruments to distinguish if the higher harvesting of 
the other agent responds to a cooperative biased strategy or to free-riding intentions as 
expressed in (19), the agent can be induced to opt for a trigger strategy in the presence 
of ℎ𝑖(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑗𝑐(𝑡𝑏) , even if ℎ𝑖(𝑡𝑏)  responds to the cooperative strategy in which ℎ𝑖(𝑡𝑏) = ℎ𝑖𝑐(𝑡𝑏). If agent j interprets ℎ𝑖(𝑡𝑏) as a free-rider attempt, the trigger strategy 
of agent j may involve an increase in the next harvesting amount until the Nash 
dominant non-cooperative amount, such that ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏 + 1) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥; however, agent i still 
harvests her own cooperative amount. Thus, if ℎ𝑖(𝑡𝑏 + 1) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 , at time 𝑡𝑏 + 1 is ℎ𝑖𝑏(𝑡𝑏 + 1) < ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏 + 1) with ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏 + 1) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥.  (26) 
The increase in the harvesting level of agent j cannot be interpreted by agent i as an 
answer to her biased behavior because—as this model assumes—naïve agents are not 
conscious of their bias and are unable to recognize the appearance of their behavior as 
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potential free-rider behavior. Notably, naïve agents have incomplete self-knowledge 
regarding the biased nature of their behaviors.  
Hence, observing an amount harvested by agent j greater than the cooperative amount, 
agent i can interpret the harvesting amount of the j agent as a free-riding behavior 
attempt because from the viewpoint of agent i, she has cooperated until time 𝑡 + 1; 
consequently, she also can choose to start trigger-strategy harvesting at time 𝑡 + 2, an 
amount equal to ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥. At this time, a non-cooperant Nash equilibrium is reached in 
which ℎ𝑖(𝑡 + 2) = ℎ𝑗(𝑡 + 2) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥. (27) 
Similar dynamics can also be triggered by a large number of harvesters. Thus, the 
question raised next is how the implication of present bias in these defective behaviors 
from the cooperative equilibrium can explicate a dynamic of cascading defections.  
 
5. A restrictive case of cascading defections 
 
Because the issue is how the present bias leads to defective strategies that in the absence 
of which such strategies will not occur, analysis of the behavior of the agents that 
deliberately choose to be free riders from the beginning is unnecessary. In this case, any 
effect of present bias is not relevant to adopting defective strategies, for the obvious 
reason that in presence of free-rider intentions, the defective strategies from the 
cooperative equilibrium are a consequence of free riding a priori and independent from 
the intertemporal bias. Hence, to show the effect of the present bias in the trigger, a 
defective strategy, the case in which all the N agents are cooperative, is considered.  
The agents simultaneously harvest from the same stock of resources for T periods, the 
features regarding the stock of resources, growth rate, constraints, and utility function 
are those already presented in the model. Agents follow a tit-for-tat strategy, implying 
that they choose the cooperative strategy in the first round, but their cooperative 
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intentions are not common knowledge. Agents are heterogeneous in their bias discount 
factors, and each agent makes her choice to harvest for a given period after having 
observed the amount harvested by the other agents in the previous period, which is the 
only information on others made available.  
In every period t, each agent performs a cardinal order of all the amounts harvested, 
such that it is identified with ℎ1(𝑡), the amount harvested by the agent that harvests less, 
and in an increasing order Ah until ℎ𝑁(𝑡), where agent N is that agent who harvests 
more: 𝐴ℎ = {ℎ1(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑛(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑁(𝑡)}, (28) 
where each n agent can distinguish the n-1 agents that have harvested less than her from 
the N-n agents that have harvested more. 
In every round, each agent decides whether to implement the cooperative or defective 
strategy. In the first case, the cooperative amount harvested will be given by the 
maximization at time t of (17), under the usual constraints, for the periods of the 
residual periods of interaction [𝑡 , 𝑇]. Otherwise, the defection strategy comprises the 
adoption of the dominant Nash strategy that implies harvesting ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 until the end of the 
interactions. 
Each agent assigns a given probability, 𝑝𝑛(𝑓), that other agents are free riders; 𝑝𝑛(𝑓) is 
based only on the agent’s personal belief. The same probability to be a free rider is 
assigned to each other agent; thus, 𝑝𝑛(𝑓) = 𝐹𝑛𝑁 − 1,  (29) 
where 𝐹𝑛 is the number of free riders present in the group estimated by agent n. 
The estimation is only subjective and is formulated by the agent in a condition of lack 
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of information; thus, it is not assumed that this estimation is equal for all agents.14 The 
agent constructs her personal beliefs with an action of mental accounting where she 
infers the probability used in the actual context from her experiences in other contexts 
(Gigerenzer et al. 1991). The logical induction derived from the representative agent’s 
subjective long-term memory suggests that because she experienced acts of free riding 
in similar contexts, she should use her experiences in the present context, assuming a 
strictly positive probability that other agents could be free riders. Hence, 𝑝𝑛(𝑓) > 0  ∀ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁.  (30) 
The representative agent starts harvesting a cooperative amount, ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡), and continues to 
cooperate as long as she believes that the other agents are also cooperating. The strategy 
instead prescribes the defection when the agent’s belief leads her to estimate that at least 
one agent with free-rider intentions has caused her damage with an amount harvested 
that is greater than the cooperative amount ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡). Hence, the condition of damaging 
harvesting occurs at time s when a member of the group takes an amount greater than 
the cooperative amount of the agent n: ℎ𝑗(𝑠) > ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑠)  with  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁. (31) 
In the case when damage occurs because of free riding, the agent defects. Thus, at each 
period t, the agent n observes the harvesting order, and at time t+1, she will select the 
defective strategy when she observes the damage occurs, and there is a given probability 
that among the agents that create the damage, there is at least one free rider. This 
probability, 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) , to determine a defective choice must be a value at least 
sufficiently large for the agent to evaluate it as sufficient for the defect: 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1). 
                                                 
14  The estimation occurs in a context where each agent is subjected to the absence of information 
regarding the real intentions of others; hence, the estimated presence of a free rider is not related to the 
real presence.  
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Therefore, assuming that s is a period within [0, 𝑇] in which (31) holds, the agent 
defects after time s when the following occurs: 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑠 ≥ 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1),  (32) 
where 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑠 is the probability condition estimated at time s. Then, the harvesting 
strategy of the agent n is as follows: 
ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = { ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥,  𝑡 > 𝑠 if 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑠 ≥ 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) ∧ ℎ𝑗(𝑠) > ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑠),ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡), otherwise.   (33) 
The result of the first proposition expressed in (22) and condition (24) determined by 
the heterogeneity in the bias factor imply a first period in [0, 𝑇] in which (31) holds 
such that the agent n is posed in a condition of damage. The observations of the 
amounts harvested enable the agent to circumscribe the N-n agents that determine 
damage. Among these, the agent n evaluates the presence of the free riders to verify the 
realization of condition (32). Therefore, defining 𝛺 = {1, . . . , 𝑛, . . . , 𝑁|1, . . . , 𝑁 = 𝑓, 𝑐} (34) 
as the set of all possible compositions of the group on N agents where each agent can be 
a free rider, f, or a cooperant, c. The number of possible cases can be given by the 
ordered selections of N-n subjects in 𝛺, with the exclusion of the agent, (𝑁 − 1𝑁 − 𝑛). 
The probability of a situation where among the N-n agents there is at least one free-rider 
is given by the ratio between the favorable cases and the possible cases. The favorable 
cases are those where the N-n agents of the upper subgroup, the number of potential free 
riders are between 1 and 𝐹𝑛. The probability of the presence of a given number of free 
riders, q, inside subgroup N-n is defined as follows: 
𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑞) =  𝐹𝑛!𝑞! (𝐹𝑛 − 𝑞)! (𝑁 − 1 − 𝐹𝑛)!(𝑁 − 𝑛 − 𝑞)! (𝑛 + 𝑞 − 1 − 𝐹𝑛)!(𝑁 − 1)!(𝑁 − 𝑛)! (𝑛 − 1)! , (35) 
 23 
 
where the probability for each agent that f is true, regarding event (f,c), is given by the 
subjective estimation of the agent n, 𝑝𝑛(𝑓), as derived by (29). 
Therefore, 
𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) =   ∑𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑞)𝐹𝑛𝑞=1 , (36) 
where F is the number of free riders.  
The defection choice derived from (33), given a period s in [0, 𝑇] in which the condition 
(31) is verified a first time, occurs if the probability of the presence of at least one free 
rider 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) is greater than or equal to 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1). Now, considering the value of 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1), an assumption is that for a probability of the presence of at least one free 
rider between the N-n agent that harvests more, close to the certitude that is  𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥1) ≈ 1 , each agent n chooses non-cooperative harvesting; hence, with                  𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≤ 1  ∀  𝑛 ∈ 𝑁, it will be ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥  when  𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1   ∀  𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 (37) 
Now, an order is considered that includes all N agents, where each n agent has the 
position equal to the position that her harvesting ℎ𝑛 has in the order defined in (28). 
This gives a cardinal order that identifies with n=1 the agent who has harvested less 
and, therefore, increasingly until the agent N who has harvested more than all the others; 
hence, 𝐴 = {1, . . . , 𝑛, . . . , 𝑁}.  (38) 
Each agent estimates a probability of the presence of a free rider among the N-n agents 
that have harvested more than him, 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1), as defined in (36). 
Thus, it becomes easy to understand that for an n that approaches 1 in the order defined 
in (38), remembering that 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 = 𝑞) = 0 when 𝑛 <  𝐹𝑛 + 1 −  𝑞, 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1. This 
implies that at least the agent that has the first place, n=1, in the order A at time s, will 
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decide to defect starting in period s+1. In this manner, a new order A is generated at 
time s+1 in which a new agent takes the first position. 
Considering (37), at each period t, t > s, after that, for the first time, the condition in 
(31) is verified, and at least one agent chooses a defective harvesting amount equal to 
hmax from t+1 until T. Notably, at every time t+1, the defection of an agent that at time t 
was in the condition 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1), determines a new order where at least 
one agent, that at time t+1 had harvested the cooperative amount ℎ𝑐(𝑡 + 1), evaluates a 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑡+1  sufficient for the defection at time t+2. This occurs because in every 
period, there is a new agent n in the first place in the order A such that 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1; 
hence, (32) holds true. Therefore, in the following period, a new agent will switch from 
the cooperative strategy to the defective strategy. Thus, Proposition 2 is possible: 
 
Proposition 2: When agents adopt the strategy defined in (33), with heterogeneity in 
the present-bias factor as defined in (12), and they assign a positive probability of the 
presence of free riders inside the group as in (30), and an assumption is that for every 
agent if the probability of the presence of at least one free rider between the N-n agents 
that harvest more is close to 1, 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1 , then (32) holds; additionally, 
considering that there exists at least one period s in [0,T] such that the condition in (31) 
is verified, for every period after time s, at least one agent inside the group stops 
cooperating. 
 
The process just exposed auto-fuels time after time and leads, for a sufficiently large 
period of interaction, to the disappearance of the cooperative actions within the group 
reaching a non-cooperative equilibrium in which all agents harvest ℎmax despite their 
previous intentions of cooperation. This process is triggered by the presence of present-
biased preferences. 
 
6. Extensive cases: condition for a cascade of defections 
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Thus far, this work has demonstrated that within a context populated by conditional 
cooperators with heterogeneous myopic discount factors, present-biased preferences can 
lead to the application of a triggered strategy that directs the agents to excessively 
increase their harvesting level, even if their motivations were cooperative. With the 
restrictive case, this work has demonstrated the occurrence of cascading defections, 
assuming blindness, no-awareness of the bias of others, and the absence of tolerance for 
the presence of free riders.15 Furthermore, this work has considered the dominant Nash 
strategy as the only implementable defective strategy. However, conditions that are 
wider and less restrictive will be defined next. Specifically, the conditions regarding the 
two decisive decision-making elements of the defection will be defined. First, the model 
will define the condition for the critical level of estimated free riders inside the group 
(i.e., the given number of supposed free riders that damage the agent such that she will 
not be available to cooperate further). The model will define even the condition for the 
estimated probability of the number of free riders that exceed the critical level 
considered sufficiently high by the agent to defect. In the restrictive case, the number of 
estimated free riders evaluated sufficient to defective was just one but with a probability 
of presence estimated that was close the certitude. With the extensive model in this 
paragraph, the number of estimated free riders and the probability to stop cooperating 
will be less restrictive. Second, the model will be less restrictive even regarding the 
definition of the behavioral strategy adopted, including non-cooperative behaviors not 
limited to the adoption of the dominant Nash strategy. 
 
6.1 Condition regarding the critical value to defect 
                                                 
15 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) accurately expresses this absence of tolerance because it expresses that the presence of just 
one free-rider (or the belief that there is a free-rider also because of an erroneous evaluation) is sufficient 
to trigger the defection. 
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Only on rare occasions do agents behave under certainty; in the restrictive case, the 
implementation of a defection strategy occurred for a probability of the presence of free 
riders close to certitude, which it is too restrictive to fit well with reality. However, an 
assumption is that the agent can choose to stop cooperating in the absence of certitude 
as well, without any change in the conclusion drawn in the cascade of the 
aforementioned defections. Notably, having at least one agent that stops cooperating at 
every period is sufficient to assume that the probability 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) must be positive:16 0 < 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≤ 1       ∀  𝑛 ∈ 𝑁. (39) 
Furthermore, an assumption adopted in the model is that the agent can consider an 
estimated presence of only one free rider is inadequate to start a trigger strategy, but she 
may choose to defect for more than one estimated free rider. In this case, agent n is 
willing to accept the presence of a physiological number of free riders, qn, inside the 
group. 
The nature of this physiological number of free riders can also be extended to include 
those who erroneously behave as free riders. This implies that the agent accepts the 
presence of a given number of agents within her group of harvesting who behave in a 
manner compatible with free-rider intentions. This extension opens the opportunity of 
introducing heterogeneity within the model, namely, making it possible to have both 
pure naïve agents and agents that are conscious of the possibility of an erroneous 
implementation of a free-riding harvested amount. For naïve agents, 𝑞𝑛  represents 
merely the acceptable number of free riders within the group, whereas for the second 
one, it represents the acceptable number of individuals that behave as if free riders, 
including those who erroneously act as free riders.17 A sufficiently large probability that 
                                                 
16 It is trivial that if the defection occurs for a probability of the presence of a free-rider lower than one, 
the result is the same as obtained when the defection begins only in presence to the certitude. 
17 For the simplicity of narration, for both types of agents, qn  refers to the physiological number of free-
riders within the group (without specifying the peculiarity of the case of the no-full naïve agents). 
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the estimated number of free riders is greater that 𝑞𝑛 will induce the agent to defect. 
Hence, 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) is defined as the probability—estimated by the agent n—of the 
presence of more free riders than the physiological one, among the N-n agents who, 
with their higher harvesting, cause damage to agent n such that 
𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑞)𝐹𝑛𝑞=𝑞𝑛+1 . (40) 
Conditions necessary for the defective choice are as follows: 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)𝑠 ≥ 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)  with  𝑞𝑛 < 𝐹𝑛, (41) 
where 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)𝑠 is the probability evaluated at time s in [0,T] such that the agent 
stops cooperating when at time s, the condition in (31) is verified, and the estimated 
number of agents that harvest a compatible free-rider amount exceeding the 
physiological amount for a sufficiently large probability of at least 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛), where 0 < 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑛) ≤ 1       ∀  𝑛 ∈ 𝑁. (42) 
The only condition over 𝑞𝑛 is that it must be lower than 𝐹𝑛, that is, the conditio sine qua 
non must have a conditional cooperant. Notably, if hypothetically the agent takes the 
non-cooperative amount only if the number of evaluated free riders is greater that 𝐹𝑛, 
she is willing to defect for an evaluated presence of free riders between the N-n agents 
that damage her greater than the number of free rider that she has assumed to be present 
in the group of N agents, but this is not a real possibility of defecting. In this case, the 
behavior is the behavior of an unconditional cooperant that a priori and independently 
by other elements always chooses the cooperative amount. 
 
Now, continuing to refer to the strategy defined in (33), but where the condition for 
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harvesting hmax at time t > s is 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑛)𝑠 ≥ 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑛) ∧  ℎ𝑗(𝑠) > ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑠), in other 
cases, the agent cooperates.18 Additionally, assuming the condition expressed in (41) 
and (42), obviously, when an assumption is 𝑞𝑛 ≥ 0, given the cardinal order defined in 
(38), for n that approaches to 1 in the (40), it will be that 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑛→1 𝑃𝑛⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  (𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) = 1.  (43) 
Thus, also when extending the properties of the agent’s behavior to condition (41) and 
(42), at least one agent in each period is in the condition to defect because given the 
result obtained in Proposition 1 that guarantees the existence of a time s in [0,T] such 
that ℎ𝑗(𝑠) > ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑠) , and given that 0 < 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑛) ≤ 1  ∀  𝑛 ∈ (1, 𝑁) , the result in 
(43) ensures that the condition in (41) is verified. Therefore, the following can be 
asserted: 
 
Lemma 3: If each agent assigns a positive 𝑝𝑛(𝑓) for every other agent, and for each 
agent, the probability of an excessive number of free riders that implies the defection is 0 <  𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) ≤  1 with 𝑞𝑛 < 𝐹𝑛; then, for every period after time s, at least one 
agent inside the group will stop cooperating. 
 
This leads to a decrease in the cooperative behaviors with the passing of interactions, 
and this decrease depends not on the real presence of an excessive number of free riders 
but on the impossibility to distinguish the free-rider attempts from the cooperative but 
present-bias choices. 
 
                                                 
18The set of strategies that leads to cascading defections is wider and does not require the strict adoption 
of Nash dominant harvesting, as is presented in this work.  
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6.2 Conditions for the harvesting strategy 
Until now, the only strategy set considered prescribed, as a defective choice, the non-
cooperative dominant strategy, ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥; thus, it is possible to consider a wider 
range of defective strategies. This work will show that when an agent adopts a tit-for-tat 
strategy, the result may be a cascade of defections, even if the defective choice is 
different from the non-cooperative dominant choices. Notably, the following is 
sufficient: consider the adoption of a strategy that prescribes that when the conditions 
given by (31) and (41) occur, the agent increases her harvesting of an amount arbitrarily 
greater than those of the precedent period and that the new amount also guarantees a 
harvesting greater than the cooperative amount. If after the increase, the defective 
conditions no longer hold true, the agent maintains a harvesting amount not lower than 
the previous amount, ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1) , provided that this amount is greater than the 
cooperative amount for period t, to maintain the non-cooperative behavior. Otherwise, 
she will harvest an amount arbitrarily greater than the cooperative amount, to maintain 
the decision to stop cooperating after the defection conditions are verified the first time; 
additionally, the increase in the harvesting occurs each time that the defective conditions 
are verified, to avoid the permanence of the damaging situation. In this case, the 
strategy can be so defined: 
ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = { ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡)ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜖𝑛(𝑡)𝑚𝑎𝑥{ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡) + 𝜖𝑛(𝑡), ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1)} 𝑡 ≤ 𝑠𝑚𝑡 > 𝑠𝑚 ∨ 𝑡 = 𝑠 + 1 if ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1) > ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡)otherwise
with   𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇], 𝑠𝑚 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆𝑛), 𝑠 ∈  𝑆𝑛 ⊆ [0, 𝑇],  (44) 
where 𝑆𝑛 is the set of all the periods s in [0, T] such that conditions (31) and (41) are 
simultaneously verified. Furthermore, the arbitrary increase must be a strictly positive 
amount just sufficient to have ℎ𝑛(𝑡) > ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡) and ℎ𝑛(𝑡) > ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1) , defined as 
follows: 𝜖𝑛(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑡, ℎ𝑛(𝑡)) > 0 ∶  ℎ𝑛(𝑡) > ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡)  ∧ ℎ𝑛(𝑡) > ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1).  (45) 
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As shown in Proposition 1, there exists at least a time 𝑡𝑏 in [0, T] such that ℎ𝑛(𝑡𝑏) >ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡𝑏) when the agent has cooperative but biased preferences, and 𝑡𝑏 is defined as the 
first period in which, because of the heterogeneity in the bias discount factor, given the 
implication of (23), ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡𝑏) with 𝑗 ≠ 𝑛; and at time 𝑡𝑏, at least one agent is in 
the position to defect in the next round, in Lemma 3, because at time 𝑡𝑏, at least for the 
agent in the first position in the order expressed in (38), the condition in (41) is verified. 
Hence, the following is possible to define: ∃ 𝑡𝑏 ⊆ [0, 𝑇] ⇔ 𝐴𝑡𝑏: 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)𝑡𝑏 ≥ 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)  ∧  ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡𝑏), (46) 
where 𝐴𝑡𝑏 is the order as in (38) defined at time 𝑡𝑏. 
Lemma 3 has already revealed that (46) holds true at least for one agent in each period 
after time 𝑡𝑏 when 𝑃𝑛(𝑓) > 0, 0 < 𝑃𝑛𝑑(𝐹 >  𝑞𝑛 ) ≤ 1 and 𝑞𝑛 <  𝐹𝑛. Notably, assuming 
strategy set (44), which includes the dominant Nash strategies and all the amounts that 
respond to a defective intention of the agent, for all the agents within the group of N, 
and defining an order as in (38), for every order At for t in [𝑡𝑏, 𝑇], given (42) and (30), at 
least for the agent in the first position of the order, the probability of the presence of an 
excessive number of free riders approaches certitude. Hence, we obtain that ∀𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑏, 𝑇] ∃ 𝐴𝑡 |  for 𝑛 → 1  𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) = 1. (47) 
Therefore, it is possible to assert Proposition 3: 
 
Proposition 3: In every period  𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑏, 𝑇], at least one agent is under the condition to 
increase the harvesting amount in the next period t+1, adopting a non-cooperative 
behavior, such that referring to the strategies set defined in (44) implies that ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑏, 𝑇] ∃ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∶  𝑡 = 𝑠 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑛.  
Consequently, if at time t, with 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑏, 𝑇], ∃ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∶  ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡); then, ∃ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∶  ℎ𝑛(𝑡 + 1) > ℎ𝑛(𝑡)  ∧   ℎ𝑛(𝑡 + 1) > ℎ𝑛𝑐 (𝑡 + 1).  
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Thus clearly, during each period, some agent increases her harvesting, moving away 
from the cooperative behavior. This implies a tendency over time to change the order of 
the agents derived from their harvesting levels, with a translation of the already 
defective agents to higher positions in the order. In this manner, the agents who are still 
cooperative take their place on the lower-side positions, observing, time-by-time, the 
increase in the probability that implies defective choices. This phenomenon determines 
the increase in agents that defect by their cooperative behavior over time. 
Notably, assuming the condition revealed in the model, it is given a context that for its 
peculiarities has always at least one agent in the stage of increasing her harvesting over 
the cooperative level. Therefore, with the passage of interactions, the cooperative agents 
decrease inducing other agents to defect. Agents defect because of their own lower 
harvesting and the increase in the value of the probability as expressed in (40) until the 
level in which the condition expressed in (41) is verified. The consequence of the 
dynamics exposed is a general progressive increasing of amounts harvested, and a 
progressive decay of the cooperative behaviors within the group.  
 
7. Conclusion and final remarks 
 
This work has shown that when the agents are conditional cooperators, the present bias, 
in the absence of appropriate information or institutions that facilitate the coordination, 
can trigger a cascade of defections from the cooperative strategy such as those observed 
in the controlled experiments. Moreover, this work shows the conditions and dynamics 
under which the number of individuals that choose to stop cooperating increases over 
time.  
The paper demonstrates that if agents estimate the presence of free riders within the 
group of harvesters using their long-term memory, without information regarding the 
real number of free riders, the adoption of defective strategies is generated by the 
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misunderstanding regarding the real intention of the present-biased agents and by the 
restricted self-knowledge regarding their own present-biased preferences. 
Thus, when agents behave conformably to their biased preferences, without any 
instrument of coordination that sustains their existing desire of cooperation, they direct 
a suboptimal allocation of the amount harvested, damaging themselves and others. 
Therefore, the existence of a cascade of defections, which is also observe in presence of 
the cooperative and prosocial preferences, can be explicated by the dynamics triggered 
by present-biased behaviors when the harvesters cannot distinguish biased choices from 
free-rider attempts. In this case, the decline in cooperation in the management of 
commons could be mitigated by adopting instruments designed to oppose the effect of 
present-biased preferences. Therefore, the drop in cooperative behaviors can also be an 
effect of the absence of institutional instruments to improve the coordination in the face 
of intertemporal cognitive biases. 
 
The model presented responds to the following idea: a true representation of human 
behavior in the social intertemporal dilemma requires the inclusion of the complexity in 
the decision-making process, and in particular, of the cognitive factors that affect the 
choices. This occurs because the social dimension of human nature must be considered 
when common resources are involved. Notably, on the one hand, the adoption of 
sustainable and cooperative behavior in relevant social dilemmas depends on the degree 
of consciousness of the effect of the agents’ behaviors on others, showing interest in and 
care for the common resources. This propensity finds form in the cooperative and other-
regarding motives. On the other hand, the choices reflect the capability of a correct 
evaluation of costs and benefits derived from their decisions. The intertemporal 
decision-making process that directs the choices is also how individuals solve social 
dilemmas. Within this process, the social preferences are realized. Thus clearly, the 
cognitive aspects and the behavioral traits of the intertemporal choices, such as present 
bias, are fundamental elements in the representation of social dilemmas. Thus, the 
analysis of present-biased preferences in the intertemporal dynamic is essential to obtain 
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a full understanding of the dynamics of harvesting (and overharvesting) from the 
commons. This understanding is also necessary to define and create suitable instruments 
that can sustain cooperative preferences. 
 
The results obtained in this work show with clarity that the cognitive factors that affect 
the intertemporal ability of the agents are greatly involved in the abandonment of 
cooperative interaction over time. However, this is a part of the complexity of human 
decisions, where all the causes of a given behavior interact. Present bias is one piece of 
the puzzle that, together with the free-rider opportunities, explicates the phenomena 
observed. Notably, the rapidity of the cascading defections depends on several factors. 
In particular, the presence of heterogeneity in the intentions can contribute to a new 
complexity of the dynamic. However, the presence of free riders, together with the 
cooperative present-biased agents, can only be an additional factor in the rapidity of the 
abandonment of cooperative behaviors. Of course, decay in cooperative intentions can 
also occur independently from the present bias if the real free riders are present in an 
excessive quantity, per se. Although these elements affect the rapidity and complexity of 
the defective cascade, this work did not define this speed. Instead, this work attempted 
to show that the observable and observed decay of cooperative choices in common 
resource dilemmas are not a unique, unequivocal signal of an increase in the free-riding 
intentions but can also result from present-biased preferences and myopic behaviors of 
cooperative agents.  
 
In conclusion, present-biased preferences can lead to the application of a trigger strategy 
that can direct the community to excessively increase their harvesting level, even if their 
other-regarding motives were cooperative. Therefore, a decrease in cooperative 
intentions can also be the effect of the absence of coordination instruments in the 
presence of the cognitive bias that affects human behaviors. 
These conclusions are relevant and useful for policymakers whose goal is to support 
cooperative and sustainable behaviors in the management of common resources. 
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Notably, sustaining the diffusion of the prosocial preferences, if the adoption of 
cooperation in the commons is a perquisite, the results desired cannot be offered if the 
individuals and the community lack the necessary instruments for the wise management 
of resources in the presence of the risk connected to present-biased preferences.  
Notably, human behavior follows complex dynamics and decision-making processes. 
The cognitive dimension plays a crucial role, and present bias is one of the elements 
that, moving far from pure rational behavior, increases the complexity of human 
interaction in the commons. For these reasons, further research should investigate the 
interrelation between these cognitive intertemporal elements and the social dimension of 
human nature. 
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